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1245 
CRACKING THE CODE:  HOW TO PREVENT 
COPYRIGHT TERMINATION FROM UPENDING 




Computer software is protected by copyright law through its underlying 
code, which courts have interpreted as constituting a “literary work” 
pursuant to the Copyright Act.  Prior to including software as copyrightable 
subject matter, Congress established a termination right which grants 
original authors the ability to reclaim their copyright thirty-five years after 
they have transferred it.  Termination was intended to benefit up-and-coming 
authors who faced an inherent disadvantage in the market when selling the 
rights to their works.  In the near future, many software works will reach the 
thirty-five-year threshold, thus presenting courts with a novel application of 
termination to computer software. 
Software’s inclusion as copyrightable subject matter has long been seen 
as a poor fit when compared to other copyrightable works, such as music, 
movies, and art.  This perceived difference will soon be exacerbated because 
termination poses unique threats as applied to software, primarily due to the 
functional aspects of software that are necessarily incidental to the protected 
code. 
Problems stemming from termination will manifest differently in the two 
primary software markets known as proprietary software and open source 
software.  Independent contractors may be able to terminate copyrights held 
in software they had previously written for a business’s proprietary 
ownership, whereas, in the context of open source software, exercise of 
termination could make void perpetual licensing agreements that serve as 
the foundation for the open source movement.  While statutory and common 
law exceptions to termination, such as the work made for hire doctrine, may 
mitigate the effects of termination, the degree to which the doctrines may do 
so has yet to be determined. 
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Fordham Law Review for their careful edits and constructive comments.  Finally, thank you 
to my wonderful family for their unconditional love and support.  To my mother, Alecia, 
father, Michael, and brothers, Michael, Brendan, Garrett, and Dean, I couldn’t have done this 
without you. 
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This Note argues that the harmful effects of termination as applied to 
proprietary software can be resolved through a novel interpretation of the 
work made for hire provision of the Copyright Act.  Additionally, the harmful 
effects of termination on open source software can be avoided if Congress 
adopts a legislative amendment creating a compulsory licensing system for 
open source works. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Just over twenty years ago, international panic spread as survival supplies 
were stockpiled,1 planes were grounded,2 and many prepared for what was 
feared to be the end of the world.3  This event, most commonly referred to as 
“Y2K,” was borne out of a combination of negligent coding practices and the 
absence of oversight.4  Nearly all computers at the time were programmed to 
track the current year based on its last two digits, which became problematic 
when the imminent change to the year 2000 would appear indistinguishable 
from the year 1900 to computer systems.5  Although the ramifications were 
speculative at the time, this malfunction had the potential to cause massive 
technological failures in all computer-reliant systems ranging from aviation 
to financial markets.6  The potential catastrophe led to the creation of the 
Senate Special Committee on the Year 2000 Technology Problem, which 
oversaw the process of rewriting millions of lines of code.7 
The dreaded disaster never came to pass, leading much of the general 
public to believe that no genuine threat had ever existed in the first place.8  
Although this sentiment may have been true regarding the most hyperbolic 
prognostications, hundreds of technological failures were still experienced as 
a result of the underlying bug.9  Furthermore, the results that could have been 
experienced may never be known due to the preventative steps taken by 
countries around the world.10 
Regardless of its outcome, the Y2K event exemplified the importance of 
the ability to both access and alter computer software code.  An 
underexplored provision of copyright law, known as the “termination right,” 
may introduce a substantial barrier to code accessibility in the coming years.  
 
 1. Kris Epley, Residents Stockpile Supplies in Fear of Y2K Chaos, GRAND ISLAND INDEP. 
(Dec. 16, 2011), https://theindependent.com/news/residents-stockpile-supplies-in-fear-of-
y2k-chaos/article_1789cb1b-2e95-5a80-a36a-92fd93cf993e.html [https://perma.cc/JEQ4-
EFY7]. 
 2. See April F. Robbins, Aviation and the Year 2000:  What’s the Big Deal?, 64 J. AIR 
L. & COM. 835, 836 (1999). 
 3. See Lily Rothman, Remember Y2K?:  Here’s How We Prepped for the Non-Disaster, 
TIME (Dec. 31, 2014, 12:00 PM), https://time.com/3645828/y2k-look-back/ [https://perma.cc/ 
4HQD-C82C]. 
 4. Dylan Mulvin, Distributing Liability:  The Legal and Political Battles of Y2K, 42 
IEEE ANNALS OF THE HIST. OF COMPUTING, no. 3, 2020, at 26, 28 (“[T]he widely distributed 
antecedents to the Y2K crisis include economic imperatives, bureaucratic decisions, 
haphazard coding techniques, a lack of managerial oversight, and scant attention paid to 
software maintenance.”). 
 5. See Zachary Loeb, The Lessons of Y2K, 20 Years Later, WASH. POST (Dec. 30, 2019), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2019/12/30/lessons-yk-years-later/ 
[https://perma.cc/Z7AX-DSDV]. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. (“And while many believed that ‘nothing happened,’ there were actually hundreds 
of Y2K-related incidents.  These included problems at more than a dozen nuclear power 
plants, delays in millions of dollars of Medicare payments, ATM issues worldwide and 
problems with the Defense Department’s satellite-based intelligence system.”). 
 10. Id. 
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While unlikely to precipitate the end of the world, the termination right does 
have the potential to significantly disrupt the computer software industry and 
cause issues throughout our modern tech-reliant economy. 
The termination right is a powerful tool that allows original authors of 
copyrighted work to regain ownership rights thirty-five years from the date 
they transferred or licensed the rights to others.11  Given the popularization 
of computer software in the 1980s and its subsequent classification as a 
“literary work” protectable under the Copyright Act of 197612 (“Copyright 
Act”), many software works will soon reach the thirty-five-year threshold, 
thus becoming eligible for copyright termination.13 
The software industry has flourished in the years since courts began 
interpreting the Copyright Act to protect software as copyrightable subject 
matter.14  Due to the judicial origins of software copyright protection, 
Congress likely did not foresee application of the termination right to 
software when enacting the Copyright Act.15  Although Congress included 
limitations on termination in the Copyright Act, the limitations’ effectiveness 
in mitigating the effects of software terminability are uncertain, as the issue 
has yet to reach the courts.16 
Software terminability may have markedly different consequences for the 
two primary types of software:  proprietary software and open source 
software (OSS).17  For proprietary software, companies that hired 
independent contractors to create their software programs could 
unexpectedly have their rights in such programs stripped away when said 
contractors exercise their termination rights decades later.18  This is 
especially problematic due to the interconnected nature of software 
development, which could lead to a chain effect wherein the termination of a 
software copyright could jeopardize rights held in current programs, while 
simultaneously prohibiting further use of the original code in developing new 
programs.19 
 
 11. 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(3). 
 12. Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the 
U.S.C.); see Apple Comput., Inc. v. Franklin Comput. Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1249 (3d Cir. 
1983). 
 13. See Timothy K. Armstrong, Shrinking the Commons:  Termination of Copyright 
Licenses and Transfers for the Benefit of the Public, 47 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 359, 362 (2009) 
(explaining that a particular form of software license is too recent to fall within the termination 
window). 
 14. See Chris Hopfensperger, Software:  Growing US Jobs and the GDP, SOFTWARE.ORG 
(Sept. 19, 2019), https://software.org/blog/software-growing-us-jobs-and-gdp/ 
[https://perma.cc/2CB4-N44S]. 
 15. While legislative history indicates that Congress did intend to include software as 
copyrightable subject matter, Congress did not discuss termination. See H.R. REP. NO. 
94-1476, at 53–54 (1976); infra note 91. 
 16. See Armstrong, supra note 13, at 422–23. 
 17. See infra Part I.E. 
 18. See Grant C. Yang, The Continuing Debate of Software Patents and the Open Source 
Movement, 13 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 171, 201–02 (2005). 
 19. Jon L. Phelps, Copyleft Termination:  Will the Termination Provision of the Copyright 
Act of 1976 Undermine the Free Software Foundation’s General Public License?, 50 
JURIMETRICS 261, 266 (2010) (“[T]he terminated licensee is prohibited from creating further 
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Software terminability presents different complications for OSS, a unique 
type of software that is made available to the public for use, alteration, and 
overall improvement.20  The OSS movement has thrived due to certain 
underlying precepts which run counter to the proprietary model.21  Foremost 
among these precepts is that the open availability of code for others to access 
and alter in a communal fashion is instrumental toward the progression of 
software development.22  The introduction of software termination may 
throw the current system into flux, with commentators warning that 
“copyright termination may be the Achilles’ heel”23 and a “potential chink in 
the armor”24 of many open source programs.  If OSS authors exercise 
termination rights, previously available code will be rescinded, thus stifling 
current use, prohibiting future development, and producing a chilling effect 
on programmers’ future reliance on OSS.25 
The impending thirty-five-year terminability threshold and the 
proliferation of proprietary software and OSS are on a collision course.26  In 
anticipation of this conflict, this Note seeks to delineate the scope and 
severity of problems created by software terminability and to examine 
solutions that could help avoid this collision altogether.  Part I of this Note 
provides the background necessary to understand the interactions between 
copyright law, termination, and computer software.  Part II explores potential 
statutory and common law exemptions from termination, which will clarify 
the types of software most at risk of being terminated.  Lastly, Part III 
proposes a statutory interpretation solution to mitigate termination’s effect 
on proprietary software, as well as a legislative solution to insulate OSS from 
termination. 
I.  THE CONVERGENCE OF COPYRIGHT LAW, TERMINATION RIGHTS, AND 
THE SOFTWARE INDUSTRY 
Copyright is a form of intellectual property protection granted to “original 
works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression.”27  
Copyright protection has existed in some form in the United States since the 
nation’s founding.28  Although neither software nor termination rights 
 
‘derivative works based upon the copyrighted work covered by the terminated grant.’” 
(quoting 17 U.S.C. § 203(b)(1))). 
 20. See id. at 263.  Although often referred to as “Free and Open Source Software,” this 
title does not necessarily mean that the software is free of charge, as licensees may still have 
to pay for their use.  Rather, it is intended to allude to the various freedoms associated with 
open access. See VÍCTOR VÁZQUEZ LOPEZ, INTERNATIONAL IP PROTECTION OF SOFTWARE:  
HISTORY, PURPOSE AND CHALLENGES 8 (2007). 
 21. See Armstrong, supra note 13, at 361–62. 
 22. See Phelps, supra note 19, at 263. 
 23. Yang, supra note 18, at 201. 
 24. Phelps, supra note 19, at 269. 
 25. Id. at 271–72. 
 26. See Armstrong, supra note 13, at 422. 
 27. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). 
 28. 2 PETER S. MENELL ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL 
AGE 2020:  COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS AND STATE IP PROTECTIONS 508 (2020). 
1250 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90 
existed at the time of copyright’s inception, underlying theoretical 
justifications and policy rationales for copyright protection are still useful in 
elucidating issues stemming from software terminability.  Furthermore, 
insight into the software industry’s technical and economic intricacies helps 
to determine the scope of the impact that software terminability may 
eventually have. 
Part I of this Note establishes the legal, technical, and economic backdrop 
against which the issues posed by software terminability become apparent.  
Part I.A explains modern copyright law, including its constitutional basis and 
statutory embodiment in the Copyright Act.  Part I.B analyzes the legislative 
history and theoretical justifications underlying the termination right.  Part 
I.C examines the work made for hire exception to terminability and its 
prospective applicability to software.  Part I.D addresses software and its 
inclusion as copyrightable subject matter.  Finally, Part I.E describes the 
current state of the software industry in both its proprietary and open source 
sectors. 
A.  The Development of Modern Copyright Law 
The origins of copyright law in the United States can be traced back to the 
U.S. Constitution, which grants Congress the power to “promote the Progress 
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and 
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”29  
This clause contains an underlying tension between the interests of individual 
authors, who seek to prevent their creative works from being copied, and the 
public, which benefits from open accessibility to said creative works.30  
Although both interests must be balanced, the U.S. Supreme Court has 
interpreted the clause to prioritize the public interest and found that the 
protection of authors’ rights is a necessary step in doing so.31  This line of 
reasoning has been described as “utilitarian” and posits that the best way to 
ensure a robust body of publicly available works is to provide incentives to 
authors to create.32  The federal government provides these incentives, which 
grant authors copyrights over their works.33  The value of a copyright is 
derived from the exclusive rights it entails, as the potential enforcement of 
these rights against others grants authors, in essence, a limited monopoly over 
the exploitation of their works.34 
Congress has exercised the power granted to it by the Constitution by 
enacting legislation that defines and protects copyright and its associated 
 
 29. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 30. See MENELL ET AL., supra note 28, at 514 (“American copyright law can thus be seen 
as primarily striving to achieve an optimal balance between fostering incentives for the 
creation of literary and artistic works and the optimal use and dissemination of such works.”). 
 31. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984). 
 32. See Jeanne C. Fromer, Expressive Incentives in Intellectual Property, 98 VA. L. REV. 
1745, 1751 (2012). 
 33. Edward C. Walterscheid, To Promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts:  The 
Anatomy of a Congressional Power, 43 IDEA 1, 20–21 (2003). 
 34. Id. 
2021] CRACKING THE CODE 1251 
rights.35  Although it has been amended multiple times, the most recent and 
currently controlling legislation is the Copyright Act.36  The Copyright Act 
contains provisions detailing both the subject matter that is protectable under 
copyright37 and the exclusive rights that are to be protected.38  The Copyright 
Act also establishes the duration of copyright, which currently lasts for the 
life of the author, plus seventy years following the author’s death.39  Once a 
copyright expires, the work enters the “public domain,” where it remains free 
and open for the public to use indefinitely.40 
Whether a work constitutes copyrightable subject matter is a vital 
threshold matter because authors of works that do not qualify cannot obtain 
a copyright in said work.41  Copyrightable subject matter consists of “original 
works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression” which fall 
within eight enumerated categories.42  Protectable subject matter is one of 
the primary distinguishing features between copyright and patent 
protection.43  This is because copyright law protects creative works and 
expressions of art, whereas patent law protects inventions that are functional 
in nature.44 
If a work qualifies as copyrightable subject matter under the Copyright Act 
and meets other judicially imposed criteria,45 copyright automatically vests 
in the work’s author.46  The exclusive rights conferred by copyright are listed 
 
 35. See WILLIAM F. PATRY, COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE 26–30 (1994) (describing the 
enactment of the Copyright Act of 1790). 
 36. Id. at 88. 
 37. 17 U.S.C. §  102. 
 38. Id. §  106. 
 39. Id. §  302(a). 
 40. See Jessica D. Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965, 975 (1990). 
 41. See Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002, 1008 (2017) (“A 
valid copyright extends only to copyrightable subject matter.”). 
 42. 17 U.S.C. §  102(a) (“Works of authorship include . . . (1) literary works; (2) musical 
works, including any accompanying words; (3) dramatic works, including any accompanying 
music; (4) pantomimes and choreographic works; (5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; 
(6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works; (7) sound recordings; and (8) architectural 
works.”). 
 43. See Comput. Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 713–14 (2d Cir. 1992) 
(discussing whether software should be considered either copyrightable or patentable subject 
matter). 
 44. See Peter S. Menell, Rise of the API Copyright Dead?:  An Updated Epitaph for 
Copyright Protection of Network and Functional Features of Computer Software, 31 HARV. 
J.L. & TECH 305, 418 (2018).  In addition to copyright, computer software can also attain 
protection within the United States through patent law.  The scope of patent protection and its 
differences from copyright protection are beyond the focus of this Note.  For more information 
regarding software patentability, see generally Bradford L. Smith & Susan O. Mann, 
Innovation and Intellectual Property Protection in the Software Industry:  An Emerging Role 
for Patents?, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 241 (2004).  For information on modern software patentability 
requirements, see generally Ognjen Zivojnovic, Patentable Subject Matter After Alice—
Distinguishing Narrow Software Patents from Overly Broad Business Method Patents, 30 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 807 (2015). 
 45. See, e.g., Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991) 
(establishing a constitutional requirement of originality, which requires a copyrightable work 
to be an independent creation containing a modicum of creativity). 
 46. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(a). 
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in the Copyright Act and include the right to copy, create derivative works, 
distribute copies, and perform or display a work publicly.47  Copyright 
holders may assign some or all of their exclusive rights to others.48  One 
notable absence from the list of exclusive rights is the termination right, 
which instead constitutes a separate section of the Copyright Act.49 
B.  The Termination Right 
The termination right allows original authors to regain their copyright over 
a work thirty-five years after they have sold, licensed, or otherwise 
transferred it.50  This right is unique from other exclusive rights because it 
cannot be assigned or otherwise transferred to another,51 and it can be 
exercised by the original author without the current owner’s consent.52  
Although many contractual agreements contain language indicating a 
transfer of all rights held in a copyrighted work in perpetuity, such language 
is invalid insofar as it is applied to the termination right due to the 
inalienability provision.53 
The motivation behind the termination right’s creation was to better enable 
authors to reclaim works they sold during transactions of unequal bargaining 
power, particularly at the outset of their careers.54  This sentiment is apparent 
from legislative history preceding the enactment of the Copyright Act, which 
recognized that “a provision safeguarding authors against unremunerative 
transfers . . . is needed because of the unequal bargaining position of authors, 
resulting in part from the impossibility of determining a work’s value until it 
has been exploited.”55 
At the time, congressional concerns regarding unremunerative transfers 
were not merely hypothetical.56  The creation of the famous comic book 
character Superman perhaps best illustrates the justifications for the 
termination right.57  The creators of Superman sold the rights to their 
character to DC Comics in 1938 for a small sum of $130, yet the character 
went on to make billions of dollars for the company throughout its ongoing 
 
 47. Id. § 106. 
 48. Id. § 201(d). 
 49. Id. § 203(a)(3). 
 50. Id. 
 51. Compare id. § 203(a)(5) (“Termination of the grant may be effected notwithstanding 
any agreement to the contrary . . . .”), with § 201(d)(2) (“Any of the exclusive rights 
comprised in a copyright, including any subdivision of any of the rights specified by section 
106, may be transferred.”). 
 52. See id. § 203(a)(5); Richard D. Palmieri, Comment, Who’s the Author?:  A 
Bright-Line Rule for Specially Commissioned Works Made for Hire, 46 U. RICHMOND L. REV. 
1175, 1176–77 (2012). 
 53. Palmieri, supra note 52, at 1176–77. 
 54. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 124 (1976). 
 55. Id. 
 56. See, e.g., Dallas F. Kratzer III, Note, Up, Up & Away:  How Siegel & Shuster’s 
Superman Was Contracted Away & DC Comics Won the Day, 115 W. VA. L. REV. 1143, 
1149–50 (2013). 
 57. Id. 
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existence.58  The creators repeatedly tried to regain their copyright through 
litigation, yet they saw little success due to weak protections offered by the 
Copyright Act of 190959 (“1909 Act”). 
Under the 1909 Act, copyright duration only lasted for twenty-eight years, 
but was renewable for a second term, extending the overall duration to 
fifty-six years.60  Both the renewal right and the termination right (as its 
successor) bifurcated the duration of copyright in order to allow original 
authors to reclaim ownership for the second duration.61  However, there was 
one major difference between the two rights:  the 1909 Act did not expressly 
make authors’ renewal rights inalienable, and the U.S. Supreme Court 
subsequently ruled that “the Copyright Act of 1909 does not nullify 
agreements by authors to assign their renewal interests.”62  As a result, 
purchasers of copyrighted works under the 1909 Act had the ability to 
strong-arm authors into signing away the entire duration of their 
copyrights.63  Inequitable scenarios of this sort are precisely what Congress 
sought to avoid through the addition of inalienable termination rights in the 
Copyright Act.64 
Following the enactment of the Copyright Act, the Supreme Court 
recognized that the text “termination of the grant may be effected 
notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary” was clearly intended to 
rectify the impotency of an alienable termination right.65  Thus, it is well 
established that the Copyright Act affords far greater protection against 
unremunerative transfers than did its previous iteration in the 1909 Act, 
largely due to the inalienability of the termination right.66  However, while 
 
 58. Id. 
 59. Pub. L. No. 60-349, §§ 23–24, 35 Stat. 1075, 1080–81 (1909); see Kratzer, supra note 
56, at 1151, 1160–62. 
 60. See Jorge L. Contreras & Andrew T. Hernacki, Copyright Termination and Technical 
Standards, 43 U. BALT. L. REV. 221, 232–33 (2014). 
 61. Id. 
 62. Fred Fisher Music Co. v. M. Witmark & Sons, 318 U.S. 643, 657 (1943). 
 63. Cf. Contreras & Hernacki, supra note 60, at 232–34 (explaining the congressional 
rationale behind making the termination right inalienable). 
 64. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 124 (1976). 
 65. Mills Music, Inc. v. Snyder, 469 U.S. 153, 186 (1985) (White, J., dissenting) (quoting 
17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(5)) (“[A]ssignees were able to demand the assignment of both terms at the 
time when the value of the copyrighted work was most uncertain.  The termination provisions 
of the 1976 Act were designed to correct this situation.  They guarantee to an author or his 
heirs the right to terminate a grant and any right under it ‘notwithstanding any agreement to 
the contrary.’” (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(5))). 
 66. See id.  For a recent example of how the termination right has shifted the power 
dynamic between creators and copyright-reliant companies, see Brooks Barnes, Disney Sues 
to Keep Complete Rights to Marvel Characters, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 27, 2021), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/24/business/media/disney-marvel-copyright-
lawsuits.html [https://perma.cc/SY5B-LC4X] (explaining Disney’s recent lawsuit to prevent 
copyright termination from being exercised by the heirs of some of its most famous comic 
book characters).  Even companies as powerful as Disney have some cause for concern 
regarding copyright termination, especially given a recent victory for creators in the Second 
Circuit. See Horror Inc. v. Miller, No. 18-3123-CV, 2021 WL 4468980, at *19 (2d Cir. Sept. 
30, 2021) (holding that the author of the original Friday the 13th screenplay was an 
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the rationale behind inalienable termination rights may have been sound as 
applied to most copyrightable works, it is likely to have unintended and 
arguably undesirable effects as applied to software.67 
C.  The Work Made for Hire Exception 
An important caveat to the termination right is that it does not apply to 
works made for hire.68  The term “work made for hire” is defined under § 101 
of the Copyright Act as either one of two forms of work.  The first form of 
work simply must be made by an employee “within the scope of his or her 
employment.”69  However, the second form of work contains three 
requirements:  the work (1) is “specially ordered or commissioned,” (2) falls 
within one of nine enumerated categories of works, and (3) is expressly 
agreed to be a work made for hire in a signed contract.70 
Copyrights in works created under either definition of work made for hire 
do not vest in the author.71  Instead, ownership and its associated rights vest 
in the author’s employer.72  In whom ownership initially vests is of utmost 
importance because ownership carries with it the exclusive rights granted 
under the Copyright Act, including the right to transfer and, by extension, the 
termination right.73 
The two forms of works made for hire operate in different ways.74  The 
clearest difference is that the first form specifically applies to employees, 
whereas the second can potentially apply to independent contractors, as 
well.75  Although status as an employee is a necessary condition for the first 
form of work made for hire to apply, the Copyright Act does not define the 
word “employee.”76  This notable absence of a statutory definition led to the 
landmark case Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid,77 in which the 
Supreme Court had to decide whether the creator of a commissioned statue 
was an independent contractor or an employee.78  In conducting its analysis, 
the Court began with the statutory definition of work made for hire under 
§ 101.79  Given that statues are not listed among the nine categories within 
 
independent contractor at the time of its creation and could exercise his termination right as a 
result). 
 67. See infra Part II. 
 68. 17 U.S.C. § 201(b). 
 69. Id. § 101(1). 
 70. Id. § 101(2) (listing the nine categories as “a work specially ordered or commissioned 
for use as a contribution to a collective work, as a part of a motion picture or other audiovisual 
work, as a translation, as a supplementary work, as a compilation, as an instructional text, as 
a test, as answer material for a test, or as an atlas”). 
 71. See Matthew R. Harris, Note, Copyright, Computer Software, and Work Made for 
Hire, 89 MICH. L. REV. 661, 662 (1990). 
 72. Id. 
 73. 17 U.S.C. § 201(a), (d). 
 74. See Harris, supra note 71, at 667–68. 
 75. See id. 
 76. Id. at 663. 
 77. 490 U.S. 730 (1989). 
 78. Id. at 753. 
 79. Id. at 732. 
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the second definition80 and that there was no signed agreement between the 
parties, the Court instead turned to the first definition of work made for hire.81 
The Court adopted a common law of agency meaning of employment and, 
in doing so, established twelve nonexclusive factors that indicated whether a 
given work is the product of an employee or independent contractor 
relationship.82  These factors were drawn from the Restatement (Second) of 
Agency83 and included, among other factors, the level of skill required, 
location of performance of the work, owner of the tools in use, duration of 
the work, and degree of control each party has over determining when and 
how long to work.84  The Court noted the fact-intensive nature of such an 
inquiry and specified that none of the factors are determinative in isolation.85  
Thus, understanding how the Reid factors are likely to apply to programmers’ 
creation of software is best accomplished by reviewing an appropriately 
analogous case. 
D.  Software as Copyrightable Subject Matter 
The history of software development in the United States has been quite 
brief, especially considering the substantial length of copyright duration.86  
Although the first programming languages were published around 1957, it 
was not until the mid-1980s that customer-facing software became popular 
among the public through the personal computer and computer programs 
such as Microsoft Word.87  Further innovation came about in the 1990s with 
the inception of OSS and the World Wide Web, and continued into the 2000s 
with the rise of social media and the invention of smartphones.88 
 
 80. See 17 U.S.C. § 101(2). 
 81. Reid, 490 U.S. at 736 (“[S]culpture is not one of the nine categories of works 
enumerated in that subsection, and the parties had not agreed in writing that the sculpture 
would be a work for hire.”). 
 82. See id. at 751–52.  The Court also established a second requirement:  if the hired party 
was found to be an employee, the work must have been made within the scope of employment. 
See id. at 739–41.  This requirement is not relevant to this Note’s analysis, but to learn about 
its application, see generally James B. Wadley & JoLynn M. Brown, Working Between the 
Lines of Reid:  Teachers, Copyrights, Work-For-Hire and a New Washburn University Policy, 
38 WASHBURN L.J. 385 (1999). 
 83. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2) (AM. L. INST. 1999). 
 84. Reid, 490 U.S. at 751–52 (listing the remaining factors as “whether the hiring party 
has the right to assign additional projects to the hired party; . . . the method of payment; the 
hired party’s role in hiring and paying assistants; whether the work is part of the regular 
business of the hiring party; whether the hiring party is in business; the provision of employee 
benefits; and the tax treatment of the hired party.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 85. Id. at 752. 
 86. See 17 U.S.C. §  302(a) (establishing the general copyright duration as the remainder 
of the author’s life plus seventy years). 
 87. See Micah Yost, A Brief History of Software Development, MEDIUM (Jan. 25, 2018), 
https://medium.com/@micahyost/a-brief-history-of-software-development-f67a6e6ddae0 
[https://perma.cc/2LE2-27D4]. 
 88. See id. 
1256 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90 
Legislative history indicates that, in passing the Copyright Act, Congress 
was considering including software as copyrightable subject matter.89  
However, before doing so, Congress created the National Commission on 
New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works (CONTU) to find issues 
pertaining to the inclusion of software within copyright law.90  CONTU 
issued a final report to Congress containing its recommendations, including 
an amendment to the Copyright Act titled:  “§ 117:  Limitations on Exclusive 
Rights:  Computer Programs.”91  Although the CONTU report did not 
mention termination rights, the limitations contained in § 117 implicate 
termination indirectly.92 
Even following Congress’s enactment of CONTU’s recommendations, the 
extent to which computer programs were considered protectable subject 
matter under the Copyright Act remained unclear.93  However, the Third 
Circuit’s holding in Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp.94 
affirmed the now-predominant legal understanding of software as 
copyrightable subject matter.95  The court held that software is protectable 
subject matter because the code by which it operates is a “literary work” 
under § 101 of the Copyright Act.96  The court based its ruling on legislative 
history, including CONTU’s creation and Congress’s subsequent adoption of 
CONTU’s findings.97 
Although the legislative history was supportive of affording copyright 
protection to computer programs as a whole, it provided little indication as 
to the copyrightability of object code as distinguished from source code.98  
Source code constitutes instructions written by programmers in various 
programming languages that are readable by humans.99  Object code, on the 
other hand, is the output of the source code that takes form as a series of ones 
and zeros that, while appearing incomprehensible to humans, can be read by 
computers and translated into an executable action.100  Overall, the court’s 
holding was important in clarifying that both source and object code are 
 
 89. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 53–54 (1976) (“It also includes computer data bases, 
and computer programs to the extent that they incorporate authorship in the programmer’s 
expression of original ideas, as distinguished from the ideas themselves.”). 
 90. Act of Dec. 31, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-573, tit. II, 88 Stat. 1873, 1873–75. 
 91. Computers and Copyright:  Recommendations for Statutory Change, in FINAL REPORT 
OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEW TECHNOLOGY USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS (1978) 
[hereinafter CONTU Report], http://digital-law-online.info/CONTU/contu6.html 
[https://perma.cc/9DA2-4R49]. 
 92. See infra Part II.D. 
 93. See infra note 98 and accompanying text. 
 94. 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983). 
 95. Id. at 1253–54. 
 96. Id. at 1249. 
 97. Id. at 1248–49. 
 98. See id. at 1246 (explaining that the district court had found congressional intent 
regarding the copyrightability of object code to be unclear). 
 99. See id. at 1243. 
 100. See id. 
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considered “literary works,” thus broadening the understanding of the 
definition contained in the Copyright Act.101 
E.  Practical Implications on the Software Industry 
The practical implications of software terminability may not be 
immediately apparent given that computer programs tend to retain little 
market value after thirty-five years of technological development.102  This 
has led one commentator to doubt the practical relevance of software 
terminability altogether.103  Yet, this view fails to appreciate that the overall 
function of a program is tied to its constituent building blocks of code,104 
which may still be in use in various ways even if written decades earlier.105 
Although the market value of software is ultimately tied to the overall 
function of the program,106 functionality is in turn dependent on the 
operability of the program’s code.  For programs to remain operational, they 
often require maintenance in the form of bug fixes.107  Furthermore, because 
nonessential alterations to code constitute making a derivative work, 
maintenance and bug fixes may be copyright infringement if performed in 
the absence of the copyright owner’s permission.108  Thus, by shifting focus 
away from the value of the overall program and toward the code from which 
it is made, the true potential value of termination becomes more apparent.109 
Source code can take a variety of forms through the “language” in which 
it is written and can perform different functions as a result.110  One such 
function is the operation of internal computer systems, as opposed to outward 
customer-facing software like Microsoft Word.111  Internal computer 
software tends to be replaced infrequently due to the associated costs of doing 
 
 101. See id. at 1249 (“[T]he category of ‘literary works’, one of the seven copyrightable 
categories, is not confined to literature in the nature of Hemingway’s For Whom the Bell Tolls.  
The definition of ‘literary works’ in section 101 includes expression not only in words but also 
‘numbers, or other . . . numerical symbols or indicia’, thereby expanding the common usage 
of ‘literary works.’”). 
 102. See Harris, supra note 71. 
 103. See id. 
 104. The Second Circuit has developed a three-part test to apply to computer software in 
an effort to separate protectable expression from the uncopyrightable elements of a program, 
such as ideas, code that is already in the public domain, and functional code. See Comput. 
Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 706–712 (2d Cir. 1992).  However, this test is 
only applicable once an infringement suit has been brought; thus, it will be inapplicable in a 
termination context without another program with which to compare it.  For more information 
on the Second Circuit’s test, see id. 
 105. See infra notes 113–17 and accompanying text. 
 106. See Yang, supra note 18, at 188. 
 107. See Phelps, supra note 19, at 270. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. See Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Lab’y, Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1230–31 (3d Cir. 
1986). 
 111. See generally Credit for Increasing Research Activities, 81 Fed. Reg. 68,299 (Oct. 4, 
2016) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1) (defining internal use software). 
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so, yet it still requires bug fixes and periodic updates.112  This dynamic makes 
internal software a potential hotspot for termination issues, as updates to the 
software could constitute infringement if attempted on a terminated 
program.113 
1.  Internal Computer Software 
One need not look far to recognize the potential implications of software 
termination.  The programming language known as COBOL, which stands 
for common business-oriented language, powered 43 percent of banking 
systems as of 2017114 and continues to be widely used by U.S. federal and 
state governments.115  Despite its prevalence, COBOL is roughly 
sixty-years-old and has been considered by programmers since the 1980s to 
be an obsolete “dead language.”116  Although plenty of new languages have 
emerged that are more complex and efficient than COBOL, efforts to 
overhaul internal software operations in order to move away from COBOL 
have proven to be extremely difficult and expensive.117  The persistence of 
COBOL is indicative of the reality that internal software operations are not 
in a state of constant innovation like much of the rest of the software 
industry.118 
Despite the stagnation of internal software systems, they still require 
periodic updates, bug fixes, and occasional significant alterations.119  
Updates often require modifying the source code, which itself requires the 
exclusive right to create derivative works held under copyright.120  Thus, 
 
 112. See John Blyler, COBOL Coders Needed for Coronavirus Fight, DESIGN NEWS  
(Apr. 23, 2020), https://www.designnews.com/design-hardware-software/cobol-coders-
needed-coronavirus-fight [https://perma.cc/ZR6E-E5VW] (explaining how major updates to 
computer systems were needed both in the lead-up to Y2K and in the wake of the coronavirus 
pandemic). 
 113. See Phelps, supra note 19, at 270. 
 114. COBOL Blues, REUTERS GRAPHICS, http://fingfx.thomsonreuters.com/gfx/rngs/USA-
BANKS-COBOL/010040KH18J/index.html [https://perma.cc/EJ2U-HXLM] (last visited 
Oct. 29, 2021). 
 115. Mark Sullivan, COBOL, A 60-Year-Old Computer Language, Is in the COVID-19 
Spotlight, FAST CO. (Apr. 10, 2020), https://www.fastcompany.com/90488862/what-is-cobol 
[https://perma.cc/A6SA-TLFX]. 
 116. Charles R. Martin, Brush Up Your COBOL:  Why Is a 60 Year Old Language Suddenly 
in Demand?, OVERFLOW (Apr. 20, 2020), https://stackoverflow.blog/2020/04/20/brush-up-
your-cobol-why-is-a-60-year-old-language-suddenly-in-demand/ [https://perma.cc/F8FU-
TJ3U] (“By the 80’s, students were being told that COBOL was a dead language, and no one 
was studying it any more.  Now, in 2020, governments and banks are pleading for COBOL 
programmers, the language that wouldn’t die.”). 
 117. Anna Irrera, Banks Scramble to Fix Old Systems as IT ‘Cowboys’ Ride into Sunset, 
REUTERS (Apr. 11, 2017, 9:42 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-banks-
cobol/banks-scramble-to-fix-old-systems-as-it-cowboys-ride-into-sunset-idUSKBN17C0D8 
[https://perma.cc/9ZU7-RW9Z] (“Commonwealth Bank of Australia, for instance, replaced 
its core banking platform in 2012 with the help of Accenture and software company SAP SE.  
The job ultimately took five years and cost more than 1 billion Australian dollars ($749.9 
million).”). 
 118. See supra notes 87–88 and accompanying text. 
 119. See supra note 112 and accompanying text. 
 120. See Phelps, supra note 19, at 270. 
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altering the source code in the absence of copyright could risk copyright 
infringement.121  COBOL is a prime example of the potential longevity of 
internal software, and there is no telling which of the modern programming 
languages used today may still be relied on decades from now.  Therefore, 
the application of termination rights to software has the potential to place 
obstacles of significant monetary cost in front of internal software 
development. 
2.  Open Source Software 
Similar concerns arise in the OSS context.  The open source movement 
was founded and promoted based on a unique set of principles that were 
intended to maximize accessibility of source code to the public at large.122  
The policy goals underlying the movement were summarized by two scholars 
as promoting security, affordability, transparency, perpetuity, 
interoperability, flexibility, and localization.123  These goals are maintained 
by licensing agreements that every user must agree to prior to using the 
provided source code.124 
Although open source licenses come in various forms,125 they all permit 
modification and redistribution of the original program, as long as the user 
abides by explicit conditions.126  These conditions are often referred to by 
the term “copyleft,” in order to contrast the open nature of OSS with the 
proprietary interests associated with copyright.127  A representative example 
of such conditions is the General Public License (GPL), a widely used form 
of license for OSS, which requires perpetual licensing, under the same terms, 
of any subsequent distribution of either the software itself or a derivative 
work created using its source code.128  Continued open access to the source 
code of both the original software and any additional code present in the 
derivative work is a fundamental requirement for a GPL.129  The Federal 
Circuit has recognized the legitimacy of these licenses, holding that use of 
OSS that does not comply with the licensing agreement constitutes copyright 
infringement.130 
The open source movement has found great success as hundreds of 
millions of people use open source programs such as Linux, Firefox, and 
 
 121. Id. 
 122. See generally RICHARD M. STALLMAN, FREE SOFTWARE, FREE SOCIETY:  SELECTED 
ESSAYS OF RICHARD M. STALLMAN (Joshua Gay ed., 1st ed. 2002). 
 123. Tony Casson & Patrick S. Ryan, Open Standards, Open Source Adoption in the Public 
Sector, and Their Relationship to Microsoft’s Market Dominance, in THE STANDARDS EDGE:  
UNIFIER OR DIVIDER? 87, 91 (Sherrie Bolin ed., 2006). 
 124. See Armstrong, supra note 13, at 383–84. 
 125. See Arnoud Engelfriet, The Best of Both Worlds, INTELL. ASSET MGMT. MAG., Aug.–
Sept. 2006, at 37, 37–38. 
 126. See Armstrong, supra note 13, at 383–84. 
 127. Id. at 372. 
 128. See Phelps, supra note 19, at 263. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Jacobsen v. Katzer, 535 F.3d 1373, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
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Wikipedia.131  Yet, with this success comes a significant amount of reliance 
on the continuation of OSS programs.132  Potential exercise of termination 
rights could threaten such continuation, especially because termination is 
effective not only on the original grant but on all subsequent licenses, as 
well.133  Therefore, even derivative programs that may hardly resemble the 
original are still hindered by termination as long as they retain some of the 
original source code.134  This is problematic given that creation of derivative 
works is not only possible under open source licenses but is encouraged as 
one of the core beliefs underlying the open source model.135  Furthermore, 
practical difficulties arise when attempting to separate the original author’s 
contributions from the modern version containing decades of additions and 
alterations.136 
Perhaps even more damaging to the open source movement would be the 
original authors’ ability to legally violate their own guarantee of 
perpetuity.137  GPLs expressly state that “[a]ll rights granted under this 
License are granted for the term of copyright on the Program, and are 
irrevocable provided the stated conditions are met.”138  Yet, despite its 
expressed irrevocability, termination rights are inalienable even by signed 
contract.139  As a result, original authors of OSS programs reserve the right 
to terminate all licenses after thirty-five years, despite their expression to the 
contrary.140  One commentator has expressed concern that exercise of 
termination in such a context would “present a clear affront to the community 
norms of nonproprietization and mutual sharing that characterize a number 
of the most vibrant open-content projects.”141 
The likelihood of an original author exercising this right may appear slim 
due to an initial willingness to contribute one’s program to the public in lieu 
of monetary gain.  However, upon the original author’s death, termination 
rights are transferred to the author’s surviving spouse, children, 
grandchildren, executor, administrator, personal representative, or trustee.142  
Naturally, there is no guarantee that a beneficiary will share the same 
altruistic motives as the original author.143  Concerns of a potentially rogue 
beneficiary are slightly tempered by the temporal limitation contained within 
 
 131. See Armstrong, supra note 13, at 361. 
 132. See Phelps, supra note 19, at 262. 
 133. See Mills Music, Inc. v. Snyder, 469 U.S. 153, 165 (1985). 
 134. See Armstrong, supra note 13, at 407. 
 135. See Stallman, supra note 122, at 203 (“Our decision will be guided by the two goals 
of preserving the free status of all derivatives of our free software and of promoting the sharing 
and reuse of software generally.”). 
 136. See Armstrong, supra note 13, at 363. 
 137. Id. at 405. 
 138. GNU General Public License, FREE SOFTWARE FOUND. (June 29, 2007), 
http://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl.html [https://perma.cc/2L5F-CVQP]. 
 139. See 17 U.S.C. 203(a)(5). 
 140. See Armstrong, supra note 13, at 374. 
 141. Id. at 363. 
 142. 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(2). 
 143. See Armstrong, supra note 13, at 362 (describing a hypothetical worst-case scenario 
along these lines). 
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the termination statute, as the termination right can only be exercised within 
a window of five years.144  Yet, considering that the program is presumably 
now known to appeal to a sizable market and that the original author’s 
goodwill may not necessarily transfer along with their termination right, OSS 
users cannot be truly secure in their perpetual access to the program until the 
termination window has elapsed. 
3.  Proprietary Software 
Lastly, proprietary software is also vulnerable to threats posed by 
termination.145  Given that the source code within companies’ 
customer-facing products is kept secret from the public, it is difficult to 
estimate the amount of code that is transferred between new iterations of the 
product.146  However, as evident from OSS, programs from as many as 
twenty years ago still retain a significant amount of original source code 
despite thousands of programmers constantly altering and improving the 
programs.147  Thus, even well-established programs are at risk of being 
stalled by the potential exercise of termination rights depending on the 
amount of source code retained from one iteration to the next. 
Additionally, proprietary software designed for entertainment purposes 
may actually retain value inherent in the program itself.  One prominent 
example is the video game industry, which is replete with examples of old 
games that have been discontinued in production yet later face a resurgence 
of demand.148  Thus, video games could prove to be a valuable asset for the 
games’ original programmers to terminate and monetize for their own 
benefit.149 
Large-scale works also fall within the category of proprietary software.  
Sometimes referred to as “big code,” large-scale works include programs 
such as Windows 10, which contains an estimated fifty million lines of 
code.150  Big code is not limited to the software industry, as it is also utilized 
 
 144. 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(3). 
 145. See Phelps, supra note 19, at 272 (“This interpretation, however, would lead to 
problematic results even when applied to traditional commercial software.”). 
 146. See Sonia K. Katyal, The Paradox of Source Code Secrecy, 104 CORNELL L. REV. 
1183, 1207 (2019). 
 147. See Phelps, supra note 19, at 270 (“[C]onsidering that fourteen years after its 
inception, Linus Torvalds was still ‘one of the main contributors to the Linux kernel project’ 
it is not inconceivable that a substantial portion of his original code will remain after another 
twenty-one years; therefore, the original license may be subject to termination.” (quoting Ilkka 
Tuomi, Evolution of the Linux Credits File:  Methodological Challenges and Reference Data 
for Open Source Research, 9 FIRST MONDAY, June 2004)). 
 148. See generally Sean F. Kane, Copyright Assignment Termination After 35 Years:  The 
Video Game Industry Comes of Age, PILLSBURY (Sept. 23, 2013), https://www.jdsupra.com/ 
legalnews/copyright-assignment-termination-after-3-37405/ [https://perma.cc/FF63-4KVV]. 
 149. See id. 
 150. Christopher Tozzi, Code Challenges:  Coping in the Era of ‘Big Code,’ ITPROTODAY 
(Aug. 10, 2020), https://www.itprotoday.com/devops-and-software-development/code-
challenges-coping-era-big-code [https://perma.cc/48QR-ZNXY]. 
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in industries ranging from telecommunications to transportation151 
(exemplified by the fact that a standard car from 2012 relies on 
approximately one hundred million lines of code).152  Naturally, creating 
works of this scale requires a collaborative effort by a substantial number of 
programmers.153  If each programmer’s independent contribution of code 
were to be copyrightable, the effects of termination on big code could be 
debilitating to the software industry and the economy as a whole.  Predicting 
how courts are likely to treat the exercise of termination rights in large-scale 
software works will help inform an effective solution to the foregoing issues 
in proprietary software. 
II.  PREDICTING THE SCOPE AND SEVERITY OF THE EFFECTS OF SOFTWARE 
TERMINABILITY 
Software terminability has yet to be addressed by the courts, thus leaving 
the current state of the law uncertain.154  Clarifying the law first requires 
determining the scope of the problem, namely, how many software works 
will be vulnerable to termination.  Determining the scope requires analysis 
of the work made for hire exception under the Copyright Act, as well as 
limitations under relevant case law relating to works created by multiple 
authors.  In addition to scope, it is also necessary to determine the extent to 
which the exercise of termination rights will actually affect vulnerable 
software. 
Part II addresses both sides of the impending conflicts stemming from 
software terminability.  Part II.A addresses the question of whether courts 
will find the termination right applicable to software by extension of its 
inclusion as a literary work under the Copyright Act.  Part II.B considers the 
extent to which programmers’ termination rights may be stifled by the work 
made for hire exception.  Part II.C examines whether large-scale software 
works will be at risk due to the exercise of termination rights.  Finally, Part 
II.D analyzes § 117 of the Copyright Act to determine the extent to which it 
may mitigate problems posed by software termination. 
A.  Will the Courts Find Software to Be Terminable? 
The threshold question that must be addressed is whether courts will find 
the termination right applicable to software.  In one respect, this is an open 
question because no court has ruled on the issue.155  However, there is no 
discernible language within the Copyright Act that would specifically 
 
 151. See SOURCEGRAPH, THE EMERGENCE OF BIG CODE 14 (2020), 
https://info.sourcegraph.com/hubfs/CTA%20assets/sourcegraph-big-code-survey-report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7D9J-SNVV]. 
 152. See Tozzi, supra note 150. 
 153. See Harris, supra note 71, at 694–95. 
 154. See Armstrong, supra note 13, at 422. 
 155. See id. 
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exempt software from the termination right.156  Furthermore, following 
software’s inclusion as a literary work, courts have created common law rules 
when rules are necessary to treat software consistently with all other forms 
of copyrightable work.157 
The primary distinguishing feature of software within the Copyright Act 
is that computer programs have limited exceptions to exclusive rights under 
§ 117.158  Despite having a separate section of exemptions, the termination 
right is not included among them.159  Termination’s absence is particularly 
notable given that Congress specifically created CONTU to find issues 
pertaining to copyright in software.160  While CONTU made numerous 
recommendations to Congress, including the adoption of § 117, termination 
was not specifically addressed.161 
The lack of a statutory exception for software likely renders terminability 
inevitable.162  However, opposing litigators may have strong policy 
arguments at their disposal.163  First, software’s absence from the Copyright 
Act is arguably indicative of Congress’s lack of intent for termination to 
extend to software.164  Both the termination right and the inclusion of 
software as a copyrightable work were new additions to the law and did not 
immediately interact with each other.165  Therefore, it is unlikely that 
Congress anticipated the consequences of termination on software thirty-five 
years in the future.166  Strengthening this claim is the apparent incongruence 
between the policy justifications underlying the termination right and its 
likely effects when applied to software.167 
The constitutional justification for copyright protection is to further artistic 
progress; yet software termination arguably impedes this goal.  Software 
differs from other copyrightable works because its creative element of 
written code is tied to a functional product in the overall software.168  
Termination of a computer program essential to a particular business could 
paralyze operations, causing functional harm that far exceeds protection of 
 
 156. Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the 
U.S.C.). 
 157. See, e.g., Comput. Assocs. Int’l v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 706–07 (2d Cir. 1992) 
(establishing a test to separate idea from expression within a computer program so as to treat 
a computer program consistently with other copyrightable works). 
 158. See generally 17 U.S.C. § 117. 
 159. See id. 
 160. Act of Dec. 31, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-573, 88 Stat. 201. 
 161. See CONTU Report, supra note 91. 
 162. Commentators appear to implicitly presume that termination will apply to software. 
See generally, Armstrong, supra note 13; Phelps, supra note 19. 
 163. See Armstrong, supra note 13, at 362. 
 164. See id. at 416–17. 
 165. See id. at 422. 
 166. See id. at 416–17. 
 167. See id. 
 168. See Google LLC v. Oracle Am., Inc., 141 S. Ct. 1183, 1198 (2021) (“Generically 
speaking, computer programs differ from books, films, and many other ‘literary works’ in that 
such programs almost always serve functional purposes.”); LOPEZ, supra note 20, at 7 (“The 
controversy is linked to the unique nature of computer software that performs technical 
functions through creative expression.”). 
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the software’s creative elements, which copyright was intended to secure.  
This dynamic is even more pronounced in OSS, as the open accessibility of 
code has been the source of substantial progress within the field of 
programming.169  Termination of OSS works would have detrimental effects 
both in the immediate and long term, as it would “shrink the commons” of 
publicly available code while also deterring future reliance by OSS users who 
could no longer trust the perpetuity of even the most explicit licensing 
agreements.170 
Furthermore, the policy concerns regarding unremunerative transfers that 
necessitated the termination right are arguably not as salient as applied to 
proprietary software programmers and are wholly absent from programmers 
of OSS.171  Programmers create software to perform a specific function, and 
they do not begin writing code without some idea of what this function will 
be.172  From the program’s function, those in the field of work can reasonably 
discern its value based on the relevant markets’ needs.173  The ability to 
assess the market value of a computer program enables programmers to 
negotiate for reasonably fair value at the time of transaction.174  On the other 
hand, authors of other copyrightable works, such as art and music, often 
create work without knowing its ultimate value.175  When market value is 
speculative, the amount purchasers are willing to pay is unlikely to reflect the 
fair value of works that become wildly successful.176 
The underlying dispute between the “objective” value of software through 
its function and the “subjective” value of most other copyrightable works 
through their creativity has existed for decades and has implications well 
beyond issues related to termination.177  However, differences between the 
two types of works are relevant to software terminability, as the “hapless 
creator” Congress intended to protect likely does not exist to the same degree 
in the software market.178 
Constitutional and congressional intent arguments against software 
terminability are not without merit.  However, courts in a textualist era are 
unlikely to read an exception for software in the absence of any statutory 
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basis for doing so.179  While policy arguments likely will not defeat software 
terminability at the threshold question of applicability, they could prove to 
be effective in arguing for other judicially imposed limitations or future 
legislative amendments. 
B.  Will the Courts Find the Works of Freelance Software Programmers to 
Be Works Made for Hire? 
The largest obstacle for programmers who seek to reclaim ownership of 
their works is the explicit exclusion of works made for hire.180  The 
Copyright Act defines two types of works made for hire,181 yet it is unclear 
how these definitions will apply to software. 
The first definition is broader in scope because it looks to the nature of the 
relationship between contracting parties rather than the type of work being 
created.182  Thus, under this definition, software is just as susceptible to being 
a work made for hire as any other copyrightable work.183  On the other hand, 
the second definition is limited to a select number of specified categories, 
and computer software is not among them.184  Yet, if courts were to find that 
computer software does fit within this definition, the effects would be far 
more consequential, as employers could effectively contract around the 
termination right.185 
1.  Statutory Definition #1 
The first definition under § 101 hinges on the meaning of the word 
“employee,” which was not defined by Congress within the Copyright Act 
but was later clarified by the Supreme Court in Community for Creative 
Non-Violence v. Reid.186  The Court established the relevant factors used to 
determine whether a hired party was an employee or independent 
contractor.187  Predicting how the Reid factors would apply to programmers’ 
creation of computer software is a difficult task, given the fact-intensive 
nature of the inquiry.  However, in the wake of Reid, an informal hierarchy 
of the Reid factors has emerged as a result of the factors’ application by the 
courts.  The Second Circuit went as far as expressly stating the five factors it 
found to be most frequently relevant and that should be weighed more 
heavily as a result.188  Relying on existing case law, one scholar has 
conducted a comprehensive study (“Vacca study”) in order to rank the Reid 
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factors by overall importance.189  These aggregate analyses are likely the best 
available method of determining the impact of the Reid factors on the 
software industry as a whole. 
The Vacca study splits the fourteen Reid factors into five subcategories of 
increasing importance.190  The most important category of factors includes 
the taxes paid by the hiring party, whether the hired party receives employee 
benefits, and whether the employee is paid by time or by completion of the 
work.191  Unfortunately, these factors are too fact-specific to be applied to 
the work done by programmers in the aggregate without a specific fact 
pattern to analyze.  However, results indicate that in cases involving a formal, 
salaried employment relationship, courts are very likely to find the author to 
be an employee.192  Therefore, it is intuitive that the programmers of most 
interest in a termination analysis are those who do not receive a formal salary. 
The second most important group includes two factors that may be 
aggregated:  (1) the skill required for the work and (2) the source of 
instrumentalities and tools from which the work is created.193  Programmers’ 
work typically requires a bachelor’s degree in computer science or software 
engineering.194  Although a significant amount of programmers identify as 
fully or partially self-taught,195 courts have consistently found computer 
programming to be a skilled occupation.196  Overall, the expertise required 
weighs in favor of programmers being more likely to be deemed independent 
contractors than employees.  The remaining factors—location of the work 
performed and tools used in completing the work—depend on similar facts.  
Intuitively, programmers who work at home are far more self-reliant in terms 
of the tools used than are programmers who work in an office setting.  
Although these factors are less determinative,197 they likely weigh in favor 
of an independent contractor relationship given that programmers are among 
the occupations most likely to work from home.198 
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Application of the few aggregable Reid factors to programmers’ work 
appears to indicate that programmers are slightly more likely to be deemed 
independent contractors than employees.199  However, most of the Reid 
factors are case-specific and thus difficult to predict, including the three 
factors that, according to the Vacca study, make up the most important 
category.200  An example of how a court would apply the Reid factors to a 
specific instance of a programmer’s work is the case of JustMed, Inc. v. 
Byce.201  Although the Ninth Circuit ultimately upheld the district court’s 
finding that the creator of the software at issue was an employee,202 the 
court’s reasoning is the most noteworthy portion of the case.  When 
considering each of the Reid factors, the court placed less weight on those 
that were attributable to the “nature of the business and the work.”203  This 
included factors such as the programmer’s level of skill, ability to work from 
home, and ability to set his own hours, all of which are typically indicative 
of an independent contractor relationship.204  The court analyzed each factor 
“in light of the kind of work” the programmer was doing, which in effect 
nullified the generally applicable factors that tend to weigh in favor of 
programmers.205  By extension, the court afforded the more particular, 
case-specific factors more importance than they would otherwise have.206 
The court’s holding in JustMed is by no means preclusive to programmers’ 
termination rights, as the case-specific factors may still weigh in their favor.  
However, the holding makes the Reid factors’ outcome less predictable as 
applied to software works.  This is because the court’s contextual analysis 
effectively nullifies the advantageous factors programmers would otherwise 
have by virtue of their line of work.207  The unpredictability of the multifactor 
Reid analysis is undesirable for both the hiring party and the worker, as 
neither can feel entirely secure in their ownership rights.208  Furthermore, 
there are additional practical issues in cases arising from the exercise of 
termination given that the facts at issue are more difficult to establish after 
thirty-five years have passed.209  Overall, the first definition of work made 
for hire fails to provide a clear estimate as to the scope of works that will fall 
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2.  Statutory Definition #2 
The second definition under § 101 defines works made for hire on the basis 
of the type of work at issue, as opposed to the nature of the employment 
relationship under the first definition.  In doing so, the second definition lists 
nine categories under which a work must fall to qualify as a work made for 
hire.210  Computer software is not included in the listed categories.211  Given 
courts’ general reluctance to stray beyond the specified categories, this 
absence has been interpreted by some scholars as an indication that computer 
software can only be classified as a work made for hire under the first 
definition.212  However, courts have recently been more willing to interpret 
the categories expansively enough to include computer software, either in 
whole or in part, depending on which aspect of the program was at issue.  For 
example, courts have considered software programs as a whole to be 
“compilations,”213 segments of source code to be a “contribution to a 
collective work,”214 and the nonliteral elements to qualify as an “audiovisual 
work.”215 
If an expansive interpretation of the second definition becomes widely 
accepted, it could drastically reduce programmers’ future ability to exercise 
their termination right.  This is due to the third prong of the definition, which 
requires an express agreement signed by the parties that the work is to be 
considered a work for hire.216  In effect, the hiring party could circumvent 
the inalienability of termination rights by ensuring that the rights never vest 
in the programmer to begin with.217  To do so, an individual or company 
commissioning the work would have to include a provision specifying that 
the work is to constitute a work for hire, which the programmer must then 
sign.218  Thus, to avoid running afoul of the inalienability provision of § 203 
by assigning the software itself through contract, the hiring party could 
instead bind the programmer in a work made for hire relationship, such that 
any work created from that point onward would vest in the hiring party. 
As the law currently stands, the second definition of work made for hire 
presents a potential avenue for employers to circumvent independent 
contractors’ termination rights.  However, there are two primary difficulties 
faced by proponents of an expansive interpretation of § 101.  First, there is 
an apparent lack of textual basis for including software in the nine categories, 
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which may immediately end any effort to do so before a textualist court.219  
Second, the legislative history of the Copyright Act makes no indication that 
Congress considered, much less intended, software to be included under the 
second definition of work made for hire.220  An interpretation of § 101 that 
can overcome these obstacles can potentially be a viable solution to the 
problems posed by software terminability. 
C.  Will Large-Scale Computer Software Programs Be Terminable? 
Another important factor in determining the scope of software 
terminability is whether large-scale, multiauthor software works will be 
terminable.  Copyrightable works with more than one author can classify as 
either “joint works” or “collective works” under the Copyright Act.221  Joint 
works are prepared by multiple authors who share the intent to merge their 
respective individual contributions into a unitary and inseparable work.222  
An example of a joint work is a book coauthored by two individuals, with 
the copyright vesting in both authors as co-owners.223  Collective works also 
require multiple authors who each contribute individually copyrightable 
works that are assembled into a whole.224  However, collective works are 
distinct from joint works in two crucial ways.225  First, collective works do 
not require the authors to share the intent to merge the works.226  Second, 
although the copyright in the collective work vests in its creator, the 
contributing authors each retain a copyright in their own contribution to the 
collective work, making the final work separable as a result.227 
Large-scale software works could potentially fall within either category 
given that they share qualities of both joint works and collective works.228  
In order to function, the finished software program must run as a complete 
and cohesive unit, which appears analogous to a joint work such as a 
co-produced movie.229  On the other hand, programs can be deconstructed 
into their individual building blocks of code, which instead seems analogous 
to a collective work, such as an encyclopedia.230  Although the Copyright 
Act defines and distinguishes the two categories,231 predicting how courts 
will apply them to computer software requires looking at relevant case law. 
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The Ninth Circuit addressed issues pertaining to joint works in 
Aalmuhammed v. Lee,232 when a substantial contributor to a movie brought 
suit in an effort to establish the movie as a joint work of authorship in which 
he is entitled co-ownership.233  The court’s analysis focused on the parties’ 
lack of shared mutual intent for the rights to the movie to vest in both the 
director and the contributing plaintiff as co-authors.234  In addition, the court 
found the most important factor to be the exercise of control over the work.235  
More specifically, the court found that the author is likely to be “the inventive 
or master mind” who “creates, or gives effect to the idea.”236  In the context 
of a film production, the court determined that the defendants, as producer 
and director, exercised sufficient creative control to be considered the sole 
authors.237  While the court did recognize that the plaintiff’s contribution 
would have been copyrightable in isolation, its relative importance in the 
context of the movie as a whole was insufficient to warrant joint authorship, 
and thus, co-ownership in the movie’s copyright was denied.238 
The court’s holding in Aalmuhammed—that a substantial creative 
contribution is necessary but not sufficient to establish joint authorship239—
is relevant to copyrights held in large-scale computer software.  From a 
public policy perspective, the court argued in a later case that providing every 
single contributor to complex works with a copyright interest would “make 
Swiss cheese of copyrights.”240  Furthermore, the risks associated with 
multitudinous claims of copyright in complex works naturally grow with the 
number of contributing parties.241  The Ninth Circuit has not been alone in 
its determination, as the Second Circuit has similarly stated that “[w]e agree 
with the en banc Ninth Circuit . . . that the creation of ‘thousands of 
standalone copyrights’ in a given work was likely not intended.”242  The 
above considerations are particularly relevant to the software industry due to 
the rapid growth in both the volume and complexity of big code.243  Courts’ 
opposition to creating excessive amounts of standalone copyrights in a given 
work thus appears to foreclose the classification of large-scale works as 
collective works. 
If programmers who contributed to big-code works attempt to terminate 
the assignment of said works, courts would be faced with a similar analysis 
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as the Ninth Circuit was in Aalmuhammed.244  Just as writers, producers, 
actors, and stage crews contribute to a movie, project sponsors, project 
managers, software developers, and testers are only a few of the different 
roles contributing to a complete software project.245  While each of the 
parties involved may have made a copyrightable contribution to the overall 
work, it is insufficient for copyright to vest if the parties were not also 
exercising control over the project as the “master mind.”246  This is true even 
if the § 101 intent requirement of joint works is satisfied.247  Thus, following 
Aalmuhammed, courts also appear unlikely to classify large-scale software 
works as joint works because no individual programmer would satisfy the 
“master mind” standard.248 
The standard set in Aalmuhammed may be best understood as a de facto 
extension of the work made for hire exception through common law.249  This 
is because, in large-scale projects involving many individually copyrightable 
contributions, ownership of the work may vest in the hiring party even absent 
an employment relationship or work made for hire agreement.250  By 
analogizing large-scale software works to other multiauthor works, such as 
movies, courts can successfully avoid threats of termination that could 
otherwise jeopardize the big-code sector of the proprietary software market. 
D.  Will § 117 of the Copyright Act Mitigate the Effects of Software 
Terminability? 
Due to the unique aspects of computer programs, which distinguish them 
from other copyrightable works, Congress established CONTU to study 
issues arising from software copyrightability.251  CONTU summarized its 
findings and recommendations in a final report to Congress.252  Congress 
acted on the report’s recommendations, most notably by adding § 117  to the 
Copyright Act and amending § 101 to include a statutory definition of 
“computer program.”253  The CONTU report explains the justifications for 
adding § 117, namely, to immunize users of computer programs from 
infringement suits that could potentially arise from otherwise innocuous 
behavior.254  For example, running a software disk on a computer results in 
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making a nominal “copy” of the program that is displayed on the computer 
screen, which would constitute infringement under the plain text of the 
Copyright Act.255  But CONTU posited that it makes little sense to expose 
every end user of software to an infringement suit for taking a necessary step 
in the utilization of their rightfully owned software.256 
Congress rectified the issue of infringing copies by creating a safe harbor 
under § 117(a) for “a new copy or adaptation [that] is created as an essential 
step in the utilization of the computer program in conjunction with a machine 
and . . . is used in no other manner . . . .”257  This safe harbor has been 
interpreted by courts as protecting necessary copies through the language 
“new copy,”258 as well as minor alterations that are necessary to use the 
program through the language “adaptation.”259  In effect, the safe harbor 
extends to cover minor bug fixes and alterations to source code, as long as 
they are necessary for the use of the software for its intended purpose.260  
Therefore, the § 117(a) safe harbor is beneficial for owners of internal 
software systems, such as the aforementioned COBOL systems, because 
necessary minor changes to source code are immunized from infringement 
claims. 
Alterations and bug fixes, however, remain a substantial issue for OSS 
works.261  Although necessary adaptations are permissible, the lease, sale, or 
transfer of those particular adaptations are still prohibited, unless authorized 
by the copyright owner under § 117(b).262  If an author of an OSS work were 
to terminate a license, individuals would still be able to use the program; 
however, it would essentially be “frozen” in place.263  Users would no longer 
be able to share and receive improvements to the program with the 
community, thus losing one of the open source model’s primary benefits.264  
In theory, users would be able to share their improvements if they receive 
permission from the original author, as is permitted under the statute.265  
However, in practice, this provision is irrelevant because authors or heirs who 
terminate their licenses would have no incentive to then allow continued 
sharing on an individual basis.266  Much like the Copyright Act as a whole, 
Congress presupposed a proprietary incentive structure when drafting § 117, 
which is now coming into conflict with the nonproprietary interests of 
OSS.267  Therefore, the necessary solution for incorporating OSS works into 
the Copyright Act is a legislative amendment. 
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III.  PREVENTING THE INEQUITABLE EFFECTS OF SOFTWARE 
TERMINABILITY  
Resolving the impending issues that will arise from software terminability 
requires a nuanced solution that addresses both proprietary and open source 
sectors of the software industry.  A viable solution must address the specific 
problems at issue in software without making changes that extend beyond the 
scope of the problem and cause unintended effects to other copyrightable 
works.  For this reason, it is prudent to begin with the Copyright Act in its 
current form to determine which problems can be dealt with sufficiently 
through the law as it currently stands and which others cannot and thus 
require further legislative action. 
This Note proposes a two-pronged solution that addresses both of the 
above considerations.  First, this Note advocates for a judicial solution to 
termination issues arising in proprietary software.  This solution posits that, 
through statutory interpretation of the Copyright Act, judges can reasonably 
expand the scope of work made for hire, and as a result, narrow the scope of 
terminable works.  Second, this Note proposes a legislative amendment to 
the Copyright Act in an effort to protect OSS works from termination.  Unlike 
proprietary software, the protection of OSS requires a legislative amendment 
because the limitations of works made for hire, large-scale works, and § 117 
fail to adequately protect OSS as a nonproprietary work that was not 
originally envisioned by Congress when drafting the Copyright Act. 
A.  Proposed Statutory Interpretation of the Copyright Act 
To address issues arising in proprietary software, courts can mitigate the 
most harmful effects of termination by employing a series of limiting factors.  
These limiting factors consist of works made for hire, common law 
exemptions of large-scale works, and § 117 of the Copyright Act. 
The work made for hire provision is the most important limiting factor due 
to its ability to circumvent the termination right’s inalienability.268  Adoption 
of a novel interpretation of work made for hire under § 101(2) will expand 
the scope of the limitation and reduce the threat of termination as a result.  
The primary issue with § 101(2) is that computer software does not explicitly 
appear as one of the nine enumerated categories of works that can be 
commissioned as works made for hire.269  Some district courts have already 
begun to fit computer software within these categories as a “compilation,” 
“contribution to a collective work,” or “audiovisual work.”270  None of the 
circuit courts have adopted any of the foregoing interpretations, yet said 
interpretations have not been categorically rejected either.271  With the 
current status of software’s placement within the § 101(2) categories in 
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limbo, an interpretation with a more robust textual basis could successfully 
convince the circuit courts on appeal. 
This Note proposes that interpreting computer programs as “instructional 
text[s]” pursuant to the sixth category listed under § 101(2) can accomplish 
this goal.272  Unlike the other eight categories, there is a statutory definition 
for “instructional text” within § 101(2) that provides a strong basis for 
including computer programs within the statute.273  To begin with, § 101 
defines “computer program” as “a set of statements or instructions to be used 
directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain result.”274  
The key term “instructions” appears to align neatly with an “instructional 
text” as required by § 101(2).275  The statutory definition of “instructional 
text” is “a literary, pictorial, or graphic work prepared for publication and 
with the purpose of use in systematic instructional activities.”276  Once again, 
a similar issue arises in that computer programs are not explicitly listed as an 
instructional text, as they are likewise absent from the nine enumerated 
categories of § 101(2).  Yet, what is included in the definition of 
“instructional text” is “a literary . . . work.”277  Given that courts have 
consistently interpreted computer programs as “literary works” pursuant to 
§ 102 in establishing their copyrightability,278 a consistent usage of statutory 
language also permits their inclusion as a work made for hire under § 101(2). 
This proposed course of statutory interpretation is novel as applied to the 
words at issue but is representative of two widely recognized canons of 
statutory interpretation known as the “whole act rule” and the “presumption 
of consistent usage.”279  The whole act rule is employed by courts to interpret 
individual words or phrases in the context of the entire act.280  As applied 
here, the second definition of work made for hire is being interpreted in light 
of two other definitions included under § 101.  The presumption of consistent 
usage is self-explanatory in that the court will presume that words that are 
repeated throughout the act will bear the same meaning as previously and 
subsequently used.281  As applied here, the presumption of consistent usage 
supplements the whole act rule analysis by presuming that the repetition of 
both “instruction” and “literary work” bear the same meaning throughout the 
Copyright Act. 
The effect of courts’ adoption of the proposed interpretation would be 
substantial.  Recognizing that computer programs can be contracted into as a 
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work made for hire will essentially circumvent the inalienability of the 
termination right.282  The benefits of this solution are that the courts need not 
wait for Congress to amend the Copyright Act and that the interpretation is 
specifically tailored to computer software, thus avoiding unintended 
consequences on other works that may result from a legislative amendment. 
Those who may challenge the above method of interpretation would likely 
point to the absence of congressional intent indicating that the second 
definition of work made for hire was intended to encompass computer 
programs.  There is merit to this challenge, given that at least one circuit court 
has interpreted § 101 as indicative of congressional intent to create both a 
broad catchall through the first definition and narrow carveout through the 
second definition.283  However, the Supreme Court has long been careful not 
to interpret the absence of congressional intent as evidence of congressional 
disapproval.284  Thus, while Congress may not have intended to include 
software within § 101(2) when enacting the Copyright Act, the language of 
“instructional text” is sufficiently broad to encompass computer programs in 
light of their statutory definition. 
Another critique of this approach is that it may appear inequitable that 
programmers can have their termination right circumvented retroactively 
through a novel interpretation of § 101(2).  Yet, concerns of this nature are 
mitigated by the other two requirements of § 101(2):  (1) that the work is 
specially commissioned and (2) that it is agreed to constitute a work made 
for hire through a signed contract.285  Programmers who voluntarily agreed 
to sign away their works as works made for hire cannot reasonably claim that 
they expected the copyright to nonetheless vest in themselves as the author.  
Perhaps programmers who paid careful attention to the enumerated 
categories of § 101(2) can plausibly claim as much—yet that would have 
required them to sign a contract they believed to be legally unsound, thus 
violating the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing inherent in 
contractual agreements286 and vitiating any claim of inequity as a result.  
Therefore, retroactive application of the novel interpretation of § 101(2) is a 
sufficiently equitable result for both contracting parties regardless of their 
knowledge of the statute or lack thereof. 
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In addition to retroactivity concerns, prospective concerns could be raised 
about the threat of unremunerative transfers.287  However, programmers are 
better suited to overcome this imbalance and negotiate around § 101(2) due 
to the distinguishing factors that set them apart from most other authors who 
require such protection.288  Given that works made for hire under § 101(2) 
must be specially commissioned, it is reasonable to infer that purchasers who 
reach out to programmers are doing so because they require a particular 
service or expertise.  Programmers have far more negotiating power in this 
circumstance as opposed to authors of other works because both parties have 
a mutual need.289  Therefore, programmers need not sign contracts that 
specify that their works are to be made for hire.290  Programmers can weigh 
the short-term and long-term benefits of either foregoing or retaining their 
termination right in the process of negotiating the terms of contracts.  Overall, 
the resulting dynamic of the proposed interpretative solution provides more 
transparency in the negotiation process, while also providing sufficient 
flexibility for programmers to leverage their termination rights. 
B.  Legislative Amendment to Solve Termination Issues in Open Source 
Software 
Unlike proprietary software, OSS requires a legislative solution because 
the limiting factors on termination contained in the Copyright Act are largely 
inapplicable to OSS.  The work made for hire doctrine, as the most important 
limitation, is largely absent from OSS because contributions are made on a 
voluntary basis rather than through an employment relationship.291  
Similarly, the de facto exception for large-scale works is essentially a 
nonfactor because the use of licensing agreements in OSS precludes 
satisfaction of the necessary intent-to-merge requirement.292  Lastly, § 117 
fails to protect a vital function of OSS, in that distribution of derivative 
works, including bug fixes and updates, constitutes infringement and is thus 
prohibited under the Copyright Act.293  The above shortcomings are not 
rectifiable through judicial interpretation of the Copyright Act in its current 
form, thus making a legislative amendment the necessary solution. 
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One scholar has advocated for a legislative amendment which would allow 
copyright owners to abandon their copyrights by making an express 
dedication of their works to the public domain.294  This solution is 
particularly attractive because it draws from an existing provision of the 
Patent Act of 1952, which enables patent abandonment, to create an 
analogous right in the Copyright Act.295  The public policy effects of patent 
abandonment are assessable by legislators, thus enabling them to draw 
reasonable conclusions about how abandonment would likely play out in 
copyright. 
However, the proposed amendment is deficient because, while the original 
OSS program is placed in the public domain through abandonment, all 
subsequent derivative works are free from licensing constraints and may, in 
essence, cease to be OSS works.  This is because the original author of the 
program cannot retain perpetual open access to source code through licensing 
arrangements such as the GPL once the author’s program is abandoned.  Any 
additional code added by a subsequent author can be kept secret from the 
public, thus making the closed portion of the derivative work’s code 
indistinguishable from other proprietary software.  Given that perpetual open 
access to code is one of the core features of OSS, its loss makes this solution 
less than ideal. 
Instead, Congress should enact legislation that creates a voluntary 
compulsory licensing scheme for OSS works.  Compulsory licensing 
schemes already exist within the Copyright Act, though they are mostly 
limited to the music industry.296  Under § 115, artists are required to license 
the underlying musical compositions of their songs to others who wish to use 
the copyrights for permissible purposes, such as creating a cover of said 
songs.297  This provision was intended to strike a balance between the 
original artists’ rights and subsequent artists’ ability to draw from a well of 
existing creativity in the furtherance of their own creative efforts.298  In other 
words, the compulsory licensing scheme shares many of the same 
justifications underlying the OSS movement.299  Thus, § 115 serves as a 
natural starting point in creating a legislative solution for OSS. 
Congress should recognize and define OSS by adding a statutory definition 
of “open source software” under § 101 of the Copyright Act.  Next, a 
centralized licensing body should be created to act as the intermediary 
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between the original authors of OSS programs and those who wish to use or 
alter the program.  In practice, the licensing body would function similarly 
to the Mechanical Licensing Collective, a nonprofit organization that is 
responsible for administering compulsory licenses in the music industry.300  
That is, the licensing body would create a database of OSS works,301 enforce 
either the default “blanket license”302 or a different license upon which both 
parties have agreed,303 and oversee the payment of royalties.304  The 
licensing body would not be responsible for regulating the substance of the 
agreement, as long as it is consistent with the statutory definition of an OSS 
work.  Most OSS works today are licensed through standardized agreements 
such as the GPL, effectively minimizing transaction costs of the case-by-case 
negotiation of terms.305  The licensing body would facilitate this process by 
establishing the GPL as the default license to which the licensee and licensor 
reserve the right to opt out of for a privately negotiated license. 
The benefits of the centralized nature of the licensing body come into play 
when considering derivative works.  The licensing body will have on file the 
information of all users of the original OSS program, such that a programmer 
seeking to license a derivative of the original can do so through the same 
process.  The author of the derivative work could use either the default 
licensing agreement, or one that is less restrictive, but could not use a more 
restrictive agreement.  Thus, perpetual open access to the original program’s 
source code is not only guaranteed under this proposal just as it is currently 
but also made more accessible and accountable through the centralized 
licensing body. 
Finally, to rectify the issues posed by termination, Congress should add a 
provision to § 203 specifying that OSS works issued through a compulsory 
licensing system cannot be terminated.  This provision is necessary to ensure 
that the OSS works remain accessible to the public in perpetuity.  Concerns 
regarding unremunerative transfers are moot under a compulsory licensing 
system, given that they operate based on a fixed royalty rate from which the 
licensors automatically receive payment upon use of their works.306  Absent 
the core justification underlying the existence of the termination right, there 
is little reason to retain termination in OSS works under a compulsory 
licensing system.  The one caveat is that transfers of the original work itself 
should remain terminable, as such transfers carry with them the royalties 
earned through compulsory licenses.  Thus, while public access through 
compulsory licensing remains open in perpetuity regardless of who owns the 
original, the original author of the OSS work is free to maintain ownership, 
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or if the author chooses to transfer it, the author may recover ownership 
through termination thirty-five years later.  This arrangement would be ideal, 
as it would strike the balance between public access and private ownership 
while avoiding the issue of unremunerative transfers altogether. 
Although a compulsory licensing system may be a viable solution to the 
problems posed to OSS by termination, the intricacies of a full amendment 
to the Copyright Act will take a substantial amount of time to explore.  This 
is evident from the music industry, which has seen multiple revisions of its 
compulsory licensing system, the most recent of which is the Orrin G. 
Hatch-Bob Goodlatte Music Modernization Act.307  It would be prudent to 
wait and see how recent changes to the compulsory licensing framework play 
out in practice before implementing an analogous system for OSS.  
Fortunately for Congress, the gap in time before termination issues arise is 
larger for OSS, as it only started to become “mainstream”308 in the early 
2000s.  Due to the thirty-five-year threshold, as well as the time it may take 
for OSS authors to both recognize that they have a termination right and then 
proceed to exercise it, Congress may have well over a decade to prepare the 
proposed amendment. 
In the meantime, perhaps it would be worthwhile for Congress to take the 
first step, as advocated by the Second Circuit nearly three decades ago, by 
commissioning a “CONTU II” to consider updates to the Copyright Act that 
reflect the rapidly evolving software industry.309  At the forefront of such 
considerations should be solutions to the intersection of termination and 
software.  The issues raised and the solutions presented by this Note can 
contribute to this ongoing discussion. 
CONCLUSION 
Technological advancement and the law are rarely, if ever, working in 
tandem.  By including computer software as copyrightable subject matter, 
Congress and the courts alike have treated software much the same as art, 
movies, and literature.  However, due to the rapid growth of the software 
industry and the unforeseen development of OSS, it is time for Congress to 
recognize the unique threat that copyright termination poses to software in 
particular.  The fact that software termination may be years away is not an 
excuse for complacency.  Rather, Congress should view it as an opportunity 
to preemptively rectify the law before its economic consequences are felt. 
The solutions presented by this Note address proprietary software and OSS 
with the respective levels of urgency they require.  Courts can adopt the 
proposed interpretation of “instructional texts,” such that proprietary 
software may be considered work made for hire, thus making what was 
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previously an unalienable termination right a de facto alienable right.  A 
judicial solution such as this is ideal for proprietary software because the 
thirty-five-year termination threshold will be reached much sooner than the 
window for OSS.  The extended gap of time before OSS reaches the threshold 
provides Congress with ample opportunity to consider and draft a solution.  
Accordingly, this Note’s legislative proposal for a compulsory licensing 
system is tailored to meet Congress’s time frame. 
Issues raised by software terminability represent a larger tendency of the 
law to lag behind technological development, which is an unfortunate, but 
not unavoidable, phenomenon.  By preemptively addressing future problems, 
the law may finally start to facilitate, rather than hinder, the inevitability of 
technological progression. 
